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FROM LIMINARS TO OTHERS:  
SECURITIZATION THROUGH MYTHS 
 
 
Karsten Friis 
 
 
Abstract 
The article discusses the rise of societal and ethnic conflicts. It focuses on some of the analytical tools designed 
to illuminate these processes. More specifically it builds on the framework of the so-called "Copenhagen 
School of Security Studies" but seeks to develop a more flexible approach on the concept of identity. To 
understand how an identity gains strength, Roland Barthes’ theory of myths is examined and combined with 
Michel Foucault's concept of power. Finally a concept of agency is added, namely what has been labeled a 
“conflict entrepreneur”. It is argued that by combining these theoretical insights the process of constructing 
Self and Other, and the subsequent alienation of those who not fit these categories, will be better understood. 
 
 
Introduction1 
 
Why is it that people are willing to die and kill for their communities? How can an identity be 
so strong that it is not worth living without? What makes “ethnic” or other identity-based wars often 
more brutal and violent than traditional wars?  
To illuminate these questions, this article will discuss the concept of societal security as used by 
the “Copenhagen School of Security Studies” (McSweeney, 1996). Through a brief discussion of 
different approaches to national identities, the relational and boundary drawing aspects of all identities 
will be underlined. To understand how an identity gains strength, how it becomes an “identity trump”, 
Roland Barthes’ (1993) theory of myths will be examined. According to him, a myth is a depoliticized 
speech; it turns history into nature and makes the ambiguous ordered. This way an identity can be 
associated with a persistent core of values or culture to which a people identifies. Further, this will be 
combined with a theory of identity building based on the Foucauldian concept of discourse, which 
underlines the complexity of an identity process and its decentralized power. 
                                                           
1 This article is based on a paper presented on a workshop on “the Copenhagen School of Security 
Studies” at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2 October 1998. 
Even though the discursive field is important for identity building, some sort of agency must be 
introduced to the securitizing process. A “conflict entrepreneur” has been suggested for this purpose 
(Eide 1997). Such an agent provides both a representation of a world of chaos and a necessary solution 
to this. This is done through “natural” and depoliticized myths, which provide legitimacy for the 
entrepreneur and his policy. This may mean suppression or expatriation, making the in-betweeners, 
the liminars, match the map of only Self and Others. 
 
Karsten Friis 3 
 
The Copenhagen School of Security Studies 
 
Over the last couple of years, the framework of the so-called Copenhagen School of security 
studies has inspired a growing number of studies and triggered several theoretical debates. The growing 
importance of the Copenhagen approach is probably due to its wide applicability on almost any 
empirical matter as well to a theoretical approach, which highlights the procedural aspects of 
conceiving a threat and taking actions against it. Let me begin with a short summary of some of the 
Copenhagen School’s main insights. 
In Ole Wæver’s (1993:8) definition, “‘[s]ecurity’ signifies a situation marked by the presence of 
a security problem and some measure against it.” Security is therefore a reaction to a perceived threat. 
Contrary to most other theoretical approaches to the study of security, the Copenhagen School 
deliberately avoids the ontological debate of what is “most threatening” (military, environment, 
poverty, and so forth). Instead they have developed a framework that can be used on all fields, by 
focusing on the process of labeling a threat, the process of securitization: “They have to be staged as 
existential threats to a referent object by a securitizing actor who thereby generates endorsement for 
emergency measures beyond rules that would otherwise bind” (Buzan 1997:13). This process is the 
same in all sectors, military as well as non-military, and is the core of security as a social process. The 
Copenhagen School thereby rejects security as something objectively “given”, but regards it rather as a 
social process applicable to any perceived value, any chosen referent object. A referent object is thus 
what is considered to be existentially threatened by the securitizing actor, traditionally the state. But 
anything can be made into a referent object. Security is a social construct and must be analyzed as 
such. 
The central point in the Copenhagen School framework is therefore the process of 
securitization, by a securitizing actor with a referent object. The action of securitizing is labeled  
 
“…a speech act, it is not interesting as a sign referring to something more real, it is the 
utterance in itself that is the act: by saying it something is done (like betting, giving a promise, 
naming a ship). By saying ‘security’ a state-representative moves the particular case into a 
specific area; claiming a special right to use the means necessary to block this development” 
(Wæver 1993:7). 
 
The subjective and social construct of security is thereby underlined. This way the Copenhagen 
School opens for a constructivist approach to security studies, dismissing any “objective threats” and 
regarding security and securitization as an active social process. 
 
Societal Security 
 
To apply this theory to communities other than states, such as ethnic groups, the Copenhagen 
School introduced the concept “societal security” (Wæver et al. 1993). The basic argument is that 
whereas a state needs to secure its sovereignty in order to survive, a society will secure its identity. 
According to Wæver et al. (1993:21), a society is defined as “...having a high degree of social inertia, a 
continuity often across generations and a strong infrastructure of norms, values and ‘institutions’ in a 
wider sense.” The referent object in a securitization process will be society (Wæver et al. 1993:26), 
represented by the collective identity of this society. Thus, “[s]ocietal security is about situations when 
societies perceive a threat in identity terms” (Wæver et al. 1993:23). The collective identity is therefore 
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what the society considers vital for them in order to remain a society. If something threatens the core 
symbol of “us”, if there would be no “us” without it, then a call for protection would be expected. 
Thus, whatever the members of a society perceive to be core values or symbols can become a referent 
object in a securitization process.  
This seems promising, but there are some complicated aspects associated with such an 
approach. A major question is how we analyze this process; how we deal with such a vague concept as 
a collective identity. What is identity, and how is it articulated? How can it be securitized? Is it 
something that is “there” prior to a securitization, or is the securitization also an identity building 
process? I will argue the latter (see also Albert 1998, Huysmans 1998), and try to show this by 
discussing the process of identity building more closely, and argue in favor of a position that regards 
identity as an on-going process. 
 
The Ontological and Epistemological Questions of Identity 
 
How should the concept of identity be treated analytically? A constructivist ontology would 
emphasize the mutual constitution of agent and structures (Hopf 1998:172), thus focusing on the 
ongoing process of identity formation. Given their emphasis on the socially constructed character of 
security, one would expect the Copenhagen School to also regard identity in constructivist terms. But a 
critique has been risen by Bill McSweeney (1996) who claims that the Copenhagen School has an 
excessively rigid view of collective identity. This critique is mostly based on the book by Wæver et al. 
(1993), which also presents the Copenhagen School’s deepest analysis of societal security to date. 
McSweeney seems to have a point. There are tendencies toward a rigid and objectivist view of identity 
in the book. In phrases like “Societal security concerns the ability of a society to persist in its essential 
character under changing conditions and possible or actual threats” (Wæver et al. 1993:23, my 
emphasis), the Copenhagen School seems to emphasize a very traditional view of identity. To consider 
a society as having an “essential character” reflects a positivist ontology. Of course, it could simply be a 
badly formulated sentence, or that “essential” still leaves room for evolution. This seems likely since 
they later have claimed that they are well aware of the constructed character of identities and thus have 
rejected McSweeney’s critique.  
Still, their position is a little vague and unclear. In his article, Barry Buzan (1997:19) explicitly 
argues that “...even the socially constituted often gets sedimented as structure and becomes so relatively 
stable as practice that one has to do analysis also on the basis that it constitutes...” Similarly, in their 
answer to McSweeney, Buzan and Wæver (1997:243) argue that, “...when an identity is thus 
constructed, and becomes socially sedimented, it becomes a possible referent object for security.” 
Also, in their latest book they (Buzan et al. 1998:121) present what they consider “...the most common 
issues that have been viewed as threats to societal security.” These are all based on that “people X” are 
being challenged by this and that. “People X” already exists; their identity and values are there before 
the threat begins. At another point, Buzan and Wæver (1997:243) argue that “[t]his does not imply 
that identities do not change, only that we should not expect everything to change all the time: certain 
things stay the same throughout the period relevant for analysis.” They somehow seem obsessed with a 
need to “fix” an identity when they conduct their analysis of securitization. This implies overlooking 
the process of mutual constitution, in this case between the securitization process and the identity 
referent. Thus, their epistemology seems to be at odds with their constructivist ontology. This could 
lead to a position that holds an identity to be independent of the securitization. 
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As McSweeney (1996:84) points out, the Copenhagen School uses phrases like “independent 
variable” (see Wæver et al. 1993:185) to describe a society in a securitization process. This also is 
consistent with a positivist epistemology. Following the logic of a constructivist ontology (mutual 
constitution), there can never be such thing as an “independent variable” in social science. All social 
constructs are always in-the-making and have impact on each other. Nothing is ever independent. The 
securitization process will also always feed back on society. Identity is not just there; it is constantly 
represented and struggled over, and securitization will in most cases be a part of that process. Identities 
are social processes and must be analyzed as such, not simply as objective givens that can trigger 
securitization. Thus, to study identities one must try to grasp how they emerge and change. To simply 
describe them at a given point would be to miss that. In Espen Barth Eide’s (Eide 1998:71) words: 
“...we may choose to think of securitisation as a process which simultaneously constitutes the group 
and securitises it towards other groups” (original emphasis).2 Identity or society is not a constant. It is 
not something objectively given, and because it is struggled over it simply cannot function as an 
objective foundation from which securitization derives. This way of thinking may lead back to the rigid 
positivist and neo-realist stance from which the Copenhagen School seeks to distance itself.3  
Further, even if one for analytical reasons accepts identity as “fixed”, for instance to be able to 
concentrate on other aspects (like a securitization process), this approach obviously loses valuable 
insights and aspects of both the identity building and the process of securitization. Of course, the 
empirical investigation required to be able to cover the whole process of change and mutual 
constitution is vast; “[c]onstructivism is no shortcut” (Hopf 1998:198). Yet, by combining the two 
processes a richer picture of the whole process will be obtained.  
The problem is that the Copenhagen School also argues in constructivist terms. For instance 
Buzan et al. (1997:120) write the following passage:  
 
“Threats to identity are thus always a question of the construction of something as threatening 
some ‘we’ – and often thereby actually contributing to the construction or reproduction of 
‘us’. Any we identity can be constructed in many different ways, and often the main issue that 
decides whether security conflicts will emerge is whether one or another self-definition wins 
out in a society”  
 
                                                           
2 Parts of Eides work is published. See Eide (1997). 
3 To be fair the Copenhagen School is not alone. In the last couple of years a growing bulk of empirical work 
based on constructivist ontology suffers from these epistemological limitations. See Checkel’s (1998) review of  Finnmore 
(1996) Katzenstein (1996) and Klotz (1995). This problem is due to an explicit urge to still speak in terms of dependent 
and independent variables, causation and explanations. This goes especially for the US branch of International Relations 
constructivists who obviously wish to “bridge the divide” (Checkel 1997) between the “neo-neo rationalists” and the 
poststructuralists and thus still use some positivist concepts and methods. The price to pay for this is inconsistency between 
their ontological stance and epistemological approach.  
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This seems well in line with constructivist ontology on identity and with their own claims in the 
debate with McSweeney, but it is at odds with some of their other statements. It is unclear what the 
Copenhagen School position really is. However, regarding national identity, their position seems clear. 
They build on Anthony Smith’s (1983, 1991) theories. Below I will try to show the limitations of this 
approach and instead argue in favor of a position based on Benedict Anderson’s (1991) theory of 
imagined communities.  
 
National Identity 
 
There is no doubt that nations are historical constructs. They are results of a special European 
movement and some active nation building elite. Phrases like “the invention of tradition” (Hobsbawm 
and Ranger 1983) underline this fact. At the same time, nationalist movements have been trying to 
establish and argue that there is a history, a culture and a tradition from which the nations derive. This 
ambiguity can also be found in the theorizing of nationalism. The question is to what extent are the 
nations rooted in a historical and cultural base, or whether these links are merely created by the nation 
builders. 
Anthony Smith’s (1983, 1991) theories of nationalism are based on a so-called ethnie, which 
denotes the “core” of a nation. This perception of a common name, ancestry, culture, history and 
homeland, together with some sort of solidarity, is a necessary condition for a nation according to 
Smith. Thus, there is something essential in the culture, something that hardly changes or evolves. 
Smith acknowledges that these ethnies have to be engaged and given significance; they are not just 
“there”. However, they are nevertheless a precondition for a national identity. 
The Copenhagen School’s approach to national identity is largely based on Smith. It is in 
accordance with their view of identity as historically constructed. Simultaneously the approach 
emphasizes some core values (the ethnie) which are most likely to be securitized in a society. This 
seems likely enough. The problem with this approach, however, is that it cannot help us understand 
changes. It can illuminate how we got nations, and how they remain by relying on the historical 
background. But what if they do not remain? What if new identities emerge instead of today’s nations? 
Or what if the major symbols of a nation change? That can hardly be because of the articulation of an 
ethnie.  
If a new ethnic consciousness rises somewhere, its origins can be traced. Historical links and 
symbols as well as narratives and symbolic places can be found. But that does not explain why it 
suddenly emerged as it did, at that particular time. Attempting to do so on the basis of historical 
trajectories will run the risk of ending up with a reductionistic explanation of necessity. The rise of the 
group had to happen due to the historical circumstances. This, of course, is both dangerous and 
misleading. This is a reminder of one of the important ethical dimensions of poststructuralist 
theorizing. All so-called “objective” explanations are in fact subjective (and thus political), and all 
“objective variables” leading to arguments like “Y had to happen because of X” are dangerous, as they 
tend to disentangle the responsibility of a social action. If something happened because it “had to”, 
then who is to blame? If the historical background is used as an explanation, then what else could be 
done? Popular explanations of the war in the former Yugoslavia have, for instance, sometimes been 
based on a “lid-theory” saying that with the end of communism “ancient hatreds” bloomed as if 
someone had removed the lid of a boiling pot. This implies a dangerous historical necessity that 
should be avoided.  
Karsten Friis 7 
 
If we stick to the former Yugoslavia, could the rise of the ethnic identities there be explained 
through a Smithean framework? Of course, the three ethnic groups had a knowledge of their ethnicity 
before the war. There existed some symbols, some historical narratives and the like. By searching, 
some sort of ethnies would be discovered. But that does not explain why and how these suddenly 
became so important, nor why they became securitized. This shows the limits of the focus of “essential 
characters” or an ethnie in the studies of securitization. Instead, we need to find out how something 
becomes considered essential, and that requires another approach.  
Actually, the Copenhagen School raises a similar question: “How is an identity forgotten 
and/or reinvented?” (Wæver et al. 1993:37). To them, Smith’s approach is best fitted to answer that 
question: “It might well be that Anderson and maybe Gellner have the superior theories of the origins 
of nationalism, but ... Smith ... probably has more to offer on the workings of an existing national 
community” (Wæver et al. 1993: 37). But this claim is never really followed up and justified in the 
book.  
I would therefore rather claim an opposite argument. Benedict Anderson’s (1991) theory is 
superior to Smith’s, especially “on the workings of an existing community”, because it is concerned 
with identity as a process. It is not restricted to one special historical happening (the rise of nations), 
but it tries to give a more general picture of how a group of people continuously experiences its 
common identity. His expression “imagined communities” underlies one important feature, namely 
the on-going process. People have to imagine a community, a society, or a common identity, for it to 
be real. It does not exist unless people think so, unless they feel some sort of solidarity with people 
they never have met. 
In Christopher J. Ullock’s (1996) words, Anderson’s approach is based on “a metaphysics of 
becoming” (as opposed to a “metaphysics of being”), something that makes his theory dynamic. It 
focuses on the process of identity formations and is not limited to its historical origins. This makes the 
theory more generally applicable, both to kinds of collective identities other than states and to 
nationalist movements outside Europe which have a totally different historical background. It can also 
be useful for understanding developments of new communities with new collective identities. A non-
territorial global identity community, like the Hells Angels for instance, cannot be understood on basis 
of any ethnie, but it must be studied on the basis on their on-going self perception. 
 
Identity as Process 
 
Identity is not something that just is; it can rather be described as a process. Collective identities 
are never stable and objective but always in-the-making. They are subjectively experienced and 
expressed, a result of social communication and perceptions of Self and Others. A basic insight in all 
identity theory is the importance of an Other.4 Without an Other there would be no Self. What 
constitutes an identity is therefore more the difference from the Other than the sameness of the Self. It 
                                                           
4 See for instance Connolly (1991), Norton (1988) and Neumann (1996). Theories of nationalism, on the other 
hand, tend to be so focused on the creation of a core-identity that they overlook the relationship to other collectives. This 
also goes for Anderson (1991). 
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is the definition of the differences that establishes the Self. In Anne Norton’s (1988:3) words: 
“Meaning is made out of difference”.  
This is a classic insight from Fredrik Barth (1969:10) who argued that ethnic identities were a 
result of communication with other groups: “...ethnic distinctions do not depend on an absence of 
social interaction and acceptance, but are quite to the contrary often the very foundations on which 
embracing social systems are built.” Identities are always a result of communication; they are relational. 
Further, the symbols that turns out to be of importance are randomly chosen: “The features 
that are taken into account are not the sum of ‘objective’ differences, but only those which the actors 
themselves regard as significant” (Barth 1969:14). You cannot tell in advance which features will be 
significant for a group’s identity; it is a result of the relationship and interaction with other groups. 
Normally, this will imply choosing symbols that are different from your neighbors’, thereby drawing a 
border and establishing the categories Self and Other.  
In short, identity building is a boundary-drawing process, an attempt to define something, to 
give it a meaning, and to establish an order of knowledge. A boundary in identity terms is not 
geographical but social. It is a way of defining the symbols, values and meanings that are central for a 
group. It is a deciding of the inside and the outside. The outsider can be geographically outside, as in 
an ideal nation, but also inside. Geographical borders are results of these social borders, not the other 
way around.5  
Those who do not fit into the definitions of the Self are different and may also be excluded, 
estranged or alienated. They may even be securitized and become enemies. This way the securitization 
also functions as an identity building process. The Others are securitized because they are considered 
to represent symbols and values that are incommensurable or threatening to those of the Self-group. I 
will come back to the relation to securitization.  
This approach does not neglect historical traits (like language, culture and so on). But as long 
as these have to be interpreted and represented through subjects and through subjective experiences 
and language, they are subjective social constructs. There is no direct correlation, no necessity between 
the ethnie and the national identity. Collective identity cannot be reduced to the ethnie. Even though 
traditions, language, myths, and other features existed, there were also plenty of other myths and 
traditions that were never turned into major symbols for the nation, and also plenty of potential 
symbols that transgressed the borders of what later became a nation. Thus, the representation of an 
identity, the common imagination, is of more interest than its historical background. Nations (and 
other collective identities) do have a history. They have risen in a special historical context, but that 
does not explain how they evolve and transform today. Collective identities are not here because of 
                                                           
5 This means that geographic identity boundaries depend on social boundaries. State boundaries can sometimes 
be almost the same, but hardly ever fully. There is no necessity between a political unit and an identity unit. Of course, 
when there already is a distinct political unit, like a sovereign state as in Europe, it is of little surprise that the identity which 
emerged followed the state boarders. On the other hand, sometimes pan-movements proved stronger, like in Germany, 
and sometimes not, like the pan-Scandinavian movement around 1850. Political-juridical borders are by no means 
constitutive of identity boundaries. 
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history but because of the way we use history. It is the re-cycling of historical narratives, symbols and 
myths that keeps a nation alive. This re-cycling also implies constantly adapting to a new context and a 
constant re-interpretation of the symbols. The meaning of these might change, even though the 
symbols as such remain.  
Still, this alone does not help us understand securitization. Of course, for an identity to be 
securitized, it must be considered important. What needs to be investigated is how an identity gains 
strength and is considered essential; how it becomes what Craig Calhoun (1994:11) has called a 
“trump” -- an identity that is stronger than “...all other forms of identity, including those of community, 
family, political preference, and alternative ethnic allegiances”. In Mathias Albert's (1998:27) words: “If 
we want to gain an understanding of ‘securitization’ that does not freeze one reference point, i.e., 
(societal) identity, but can account for identity’s processual character too, we have to be able to explain 
why some issues are more ‘prone’ to being securitized than others...” 
 
Trumps and Myths 
 
It is necessary to get a better grip on this rather vague concept of identity. How can it be 
operationalized for analysis? If identity building is about drawing boundaries, then it seems necessary 
to investigate this further. For instance, what is it that is protected by these boundaries, or what is it that 
is established as signs of the identity through this boundary drawing? Along which dimensions is the 
identity manifested? In other words, how is an identity articulated and expressed?  
The answer is normally through symbols around which everyone can cluster. However, 
anything can be a symbol, so that does not really help. The symbols must also represent a meaning 
and thus some sort of value. What is important is that they are not excluding anyone within the Self-
group. They must be considered all-embracing, essential, and context-traversing. How is that achieved?  
One way it happens is by lifting the symbols out of the realm of politics -- by depolitization. A 
depoliticized speech (meaning any utterance, meaning or expression) is what Roland Barthes describes 
as a myth. Barthes’ (1993) classical work on this phenomena is still valuable. According to Barthes, a 
myth is not a false representation of reality, as it is often defined in daily usage of the word. Rather, it is 
a special way of representing reality. It is, in semiotic terms, a meta-language, or a second-order 
semiological system, where meanings are redefined and given a new content.6 For example, histories 
about wars can function as a myth for those who hear or read it afterwards. The history itself can very 
well be true and accurate, but when it is read as a myth, it gives a specific cultural and political impact 
on society that may not follow logically from the original history.  
A central quality of a myth according to Barthes (1993:125) is that it “...is speech stolen and 
restored”. The restored meaning is different from the original; it is simplified and ambiguity is made 
into order. A myth transforms history into nature, and makes speech innocent in the sense that it is 
naturalized (Barthes 1993:129, 131). In other words, a myth gives “...a historical intention a natural 
justification, making contingency appear eternal”, and thus a “...myth is depoliticized speech” (Barthes 
1993:142, 143, original emphasis). This is what gives it power. Barthes exemplifies this with a picture 
of a black man in French uniform, saluting the French flag. The picture speaks against colonialism as 
oppression and gives the impression of a Great Empire consisting of enthusiastic and patriotic citizens. 
Thus, the myth gets rid of the  
                                                           
6 Even though Barthes (1993:109) analyzes myths through semiology, it is not just linguistic expressions that can 
function as myths. Anything can be a myth, both verbal and visual expressions, like for instance photography or a car. 
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“...contingent, historical, ... fabricated quality of colonialism. Myth does not deny things, on 
the contrary, its function is to talk about them; simply, it purifies them, it makes them 
innocent, it gives them a natural and eternal justification, it gives them a clarity which is not 
that of an explanation but that of a statement of fact ... [I]t abolishes the complexity of human 
acts, it gives them the simplicity of essences...” (Barthes 1993:143) 
The effect is powerful when something social is made essential, when history is turned into 
nature, and when politics is depoliticized. If an identity is built upon such myths, it too will be 
essentialized, naturalized and considered beyond politics. It becomes a trump. If a community’s 
historical narratives are simplified and purified, perhaps represented as an eternal fight between Good 
and Evil, its identity building effect is enormous. Then, the Self is not only representing the Good; it is 
the Good. This way myths also have ethical aspects, as they can legitimize political actions that are 
based on simplified mythical interpretations of the past. For example, such representations (we are 
Good, they are Evil) leave no room for in-betweeners, for so-called liminars, who inhabit both the 
realm of the Self and the Other (Norton 1988). Liminality will always exist because all boundary 
drawing is limited, in the sense that all categories will contain some ambiguity. No nation, no gender, 
no meaning is ever “pure”. There are always some cross-overs who by their simple existence represent 
a political challenge to the order of things: “The mingling of identity and difference in the liminal 
challenges the integrity of the paranoid observer” (Norton 1988:55). Thus, a strong myth can have 
severe political implications because of its natural appearance and its apparent innocence. It can, for 
instance, serve to legitimize ethnic cleansing. I will come back to this later. 
This leads us to the question of power. Who controls or constitutes myths and identities? Is 
the meaning established through powerful actors and seductive ideology, or is the power less traceable 
in terms of locus? 
 
Identity as Discourse 
 
One problem with Barthes’ approach is his indication that it is the bourgeois who somehow 
controls the myths. He (1993:142) sees it as “ ...the most appropriate instrument for the ideological 
inversion which defines this society...” and part of the “bourgeois ideology”. The power of the myth is 
connected to this bourgeois ideology. Such Marxian views of power have been criticized, among other 
things for implicitly suggesting that there is an objective, hidden truth “out there” that the bourgeois is 
trying to mask by ideology and use of power. The idea of such a “truth” not only connotes a 
problematic objectivist ontology (“the real truth”), but it also turns power into a question of legitimacy 
(Hindess 1996). By disclosing the illegitimate bourgeois power of oppression, this implicitly means that 
there is another form of power that is more legitimate -- one which is emancipated from class-interests. 
Even though strong actors are often important, as we also shall discuss below, there is no doubt that 
collective identities can not be reduced to ideology or “false consciousness”. If people conceive it as 
real, an ideological conviction must be possessed to claim that they are “really” wrong. It also implies a 
very elitist self-perception of the scientist, since s/he is the only one who can expose this “truth”. 
Instead of regarding depoliticized myths as part of a bourgeois ideology, Barthes insights can 
be used in a fashion that neither places power within a (illegitimate) class perspective nor assumes a 
“hidden reality”. This can be achieved by analyzing myths, and identity process in general, as a 
discourse in Michel Foucault’s (1972) definition of the word. Then we do not have to rely on some 
strong powerful agents or on an all-embracing ideology that seduces the masses. Truth in a discourse is 
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not based on powerful actors or objective realities but on a horizontal field that accepts or rejects 
utterances. This field is based on what has already been said and done -- not only through language but 
also through institutions, practices and so forth. In this way meaning and truth are established as well as 
objects of knowledge. Madness, for example, is a category, an object and a field of knowledge that is 
the result of a historical discursive development. Not only science but also institutions, therapists, and 
others participated in this discursive field. Thus, to Foucault, discourse is not simply a linguistic term; it 
also encapsulates the material realm. In this way, an identity is not simply a narrative but involves also 
institutions, practices and the like, which participate in the creation of signs, meanings or objects.  
With Foucault, power can be regarded as something productive and discursive, without a clear 
locus. It is producing categories, traditions and normality. Foucault (1973, 1977) focused on social 
categories such as madness and criminals as well as institutions like hospitals, prisons and assembly 
halls. However, the ordering of people into Selves and Others can easily be understood in the same 
way. The strong “normality” of national identity in many states and the often widespread feeling of 
centuries of national consistency are examples. Collective identities are constantly being built -- in 
sports arenas, in history books, in culture and in politics. 
This discursive normalization process of Foucault also carries some similarities to Barthes’ 
depolitization in the way that both are concerned with showing how something apparently essential is 
in fact elusive or a historical and social construct. It is the entire discursive field that moves something 
into the natural and depoliticized realm, which normalizes the myths and other symbols of which 
constitute an identity. The power in a successful depolitization or naturalization should not be 
underestimated. 
Collective identity is an on-going discourse, consisting of several actors, institutions, theories, 
and rituals. This discourse creates symbols and gives them meanings and values. In this way both the 
historical emergence of the categories Self and Other can be studied. For example this may be through 
a genealogy which is very conscious on avoiding historical “presentism”7 and anachronisms -- “the 
fallacy of confusing rational functions for origins” (Price 1995:85) as well as the on-going dynamics of 
an identity today. 
It is sufficient here to note that this further develops Anderson’s dynamic “metaphysics of 
becoming,” as it gives us a better understanding of how identities can become “identity trumps,” and 
how they become depoliticized and “natural”. The “imagined community” possesses a referent object, 
something to imagine such as myths. Let me, instead, return to the question of securitization and see 
how such a process fits into an identity building discourse. 
 
Societal Securitization: Actors 
 
                                                           
7 Presentism means writing “history of the past in terms of the present” (Bartelson 1995:55). This means to 
consider contemporary analytical tools and interpretations as objective or unproblematic, and not taking into consideration 
that they are historically situated. For discussions of genealogy in general, see for instance Bartelson (1995), Dreyfus and 
Rabinow (1982), Szakolczai (1993), Price (1995) and Visker (1995). 
At its extreme, people are willing to die and kill for their identity. For this to happen, the 
identity must be considered existential. It must be considered something as basic as life itself, 
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something of which you cannot live without. People will rarely kill for their companies, their choice of 
fashion, or some other “identity light”. They fight for the identity trumps. And as we have seen, trumps 
are trumps because they are depoliticized and “natural” within the group. I have argued this is due to 
the discursive field in which the identity is embedded. From this point of view, the naming of crucial 
values, and thus of Self and Others, is a discursive practice. It is not something which is done primarily 
by powerful agents but by a mix of these and historical traits, myths, values and traditions. Then what 
about securitizing, the process of moving something into a state of alert? Can it also best be analyzed as 
a discursive practice? 
If so, it seems to be at odds with the Copenhagen School’s emphasis on securitizing actors and 
“the speech act”. These concepts seem to point towards an agency oriented approach.8 No doubt, 
securitization is often a very concrete political move, seemingly done by discernable actors at a given 
time. It is an observable process. In terms of societal security, it has been argued over and over that 
securitization is a process of making difference into radical otherness,9 or in Copenhagen terms, 
moving the representation of the Other from a politicized to a securitized position. That does not 
happen by itself. Espen Barth Eide (1998:74) has launched the concept “conflict entrepreneurs” to 
grasp why difference sometimes becomes conflictual. By doing this he (1998:74) is “bringing agency 
and strategy back in”, because “...organised conflict in one way or another needs an element of active 
ignition, of agency”.  
Thus, a conflict entrepreneur is “...an individual who takes the necessary and deliberate steps 
to ignite a violent conflict by utilising a specific situation or in order to gain something through the 
exploitation of new power relationships” (Eide 1998:75). This is done not necessarily for personal 
reasons but also for collective reasons. The point is that he is able to enter the ongoing identity process 
and manipulate and influence it. He thus has power to interpret and represent history and symbols in 
his own way, and represent the Other as an existential threat to them. Control over media is often 
important in this respect. There is little doubt that in cases like Bosnia, such entrepreneurs were 
important triggers to the conflict, as Eide and others (e.g., Majostorovic 1997) have demonstrated. 
Does this mean that the discursive approach to identity building is misleading? Not necessarily. 
The entrepreneur is also dependent upon a context which gives opportunities and limitations. For 
sure, securitization cannot be done by anyone at anytime with any referent object they like. In Eide's 
(1998:58) words, “[t]he decision to accept the securitization of a particular topic rests with the 
audience, not with the actor who speaks”.  
There is no need to reduce this to an agency-structure-debate, if that implies a need to decide, 
and an inherent either/or ontology (Doty 1997:374f). Following a constructivist ontology it is the 
process of mutual constitution which is of interest. Foucault's discourses might not leave sufficient 
room for political entrepreneurs, but introducing agency does not necessarily imply a rejection of the 
entire Foucauldian framework. Erik Ringmar (1996) has for instance introduced the concept 
“formative moment” to describe periods where there is more room for agency. According to Ringmar 
(1996:91) such a moment can be described as “...a period when new metaphors were launched, when 
individuals and groups told new stories about themselves, and when new sets of rules emerged through 
                                                           
8 They never really discuss or develop the question of agency. 
9 See also for instance Connolly (1991), Campbell (1993), Neumann (1996), and Hansen (1998). 
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which identities were classified”. This is a moment of opportunity of which some entrepreneurs gain 
more influence and power than they otherwise would.  
There is power in the discourse that provides such opportunities. For instance, a king was no 
doubt a powerful person some centuries ago, but he was nevertheless dependent upon the political 
system that allowed a king and a kingdom. Thus, we cannot locate a locus of power once and for all; 
any actor acts in a context that never can be left out of the analysis 
Besides, it is not unusual that the securitizing discourse also includes (what comes to be) the 
Other. A conflict entrepreneur will gain a lot of help if someone else is arguing similarly in the other 
camp. Samuel Huntington's (1993) attempted securitization of “the Rest” (versus “the West”), is said to 
be popular reading among Islamic fundamentalists. They tend to agree from the opposite position. 
Let us therefore assume that a societal securitization process often includes some 
entrepreneurs who, due to the situation and discursive network, can maneuver themselves as 
representatives of the community, and thus define its boundaries. The entrepreneur might use some 
myths and/or contribute to its continued existence. What also must be done, however, is to provide an 
order or a world view of which the Self is situated. This means moving politics abroad, out on the 
borders, through what Hegel (1952) has called a “dialectic of conflict”. A part of the logic of delivering 
an order to a given group on the inside is that anarchy simultaneously is moved out into the spatial 
outside (Bartelson 1995:210ff). This creates two ontological rooms, one of order and one of anarchy 
and danger (Walker 1993). But how is this done? 
 
From Liminars to Others 
 
The problem with societal securitization is one of representation. It is rarely clear in advance 
who it is that speaks for a community. There is no system of representation as in a state. Since 
literately anyone can stand up as representatives, there is room for entrepreneurs. It is not surprising if 
we experience a struggle between different representatives and also their different representations of 
the society. What they do share, however, is a conviction that they are best at providing (a new) order. 
If they can do this convincingly, they gain legitimacy. What must be done is to make the uncertain 
certain and make the unknown an object of knowledge. To present a discernable Other is a way of 
doing this. The Other is represented as an Other -- as an unified single actor with a similar 
unquestionable set of core values (i.e. the capital “O”). They are objectified, made into an object of 
knowledge, by re-presentation of their identity and values. In other words, the representation of the 
Other is depoliticized in the sense that its inner qualities are treated as given and non-negotiable.  
In Jef Huysmans (1998:241) words, there is both a need for a mediation of chaos as well as of 
threat. A mediation of chaos is more basic than a mediation of threat, as it implies making chaos into a 
meaningful order by a convincing representation of the Self and its surroundings. It is a mediation of 
“ontological security”, which means “...a strategy of managing the limits of reflexivity ... by fixing social 
relations into a symbolic and institutional order” (Huysmans 1998:242). As he and others (like Hansen 
1998:240) have pointed out, the importance of a threat construction for political identification, is often 
overstated. The mediation of chaos, of being the provider of order in general, is just as important. This 
may imply naming an Other but not necessarily as a threat. 
Such a dichotomization implies a necessity to get rid of all the liminars (what Huysmans calls 
“strangers”). This is because they “...connote a challenge to categorizing practices through the 
impossibility of being categorized”, and does not threaten the community, “...but the possibility of 
ordering itself” (Huysmans 1998:241). They are a challenge to the entrepreneur by their very 
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existence. They confuse the dichotomy of Self and Other and thereby the entrepreneur’s mediation of 
chaos. As mentioned, a liminar can for instance be people of mixed ethnical ancestry but also 
representations of competing world-pictures. As Eide (1998:76) notes: “Over and over again we see 
that the “liberals” within a group undergoing a mobilisation process for group conflict are the first ones 
to go”. 
The liminars threaten the ontological order of the entrepreneur by challenging his 
representation of Self and Other and his mediation of chaos, which ultimately undermines the 
legitimacy of his policy. The liminars may be securitized by some sort of disciplination, from 
suppression of cultural symbols to ethnic cleansing and expatriation. This is a threat to the ontological 
order of the entrepreneur, stemming from inside and thus repoliticizing the inside/outside dichotomy. 
Therefore the liminar must disappear. It must be made into a Self, as several minority groups 
throughout the world have experienced, or it must be forced out of the territory. A liminar may also 
become an Other, as its connection to the Self is cut and their former common culture is renounced 
and made insignificant. In Anne Norton’s (1988:55) words, “The presence of difference in the 
ambiguous other leads to its classification as wholly unlike and identifies it unqualifiedly with the 
archetypal other, denying the resemblance to the self.” 
Then the liminar is no longer an ontological danger (chaos), but what Huysmans (1998:242) 
calls a mediation of  “daily security”. This is not challenging the order or the system as such but has 
become a visible, clear-cut Other. In places like Bosnia, this naming and replacement of an Other, has 
been regarded by the securitizing actors as the solution to the ontological problem they have posed. 
Securitization was not considered a political move, in the sense that there were any choices. It was a 
necessity: Securitization was a solution based on a depoliticized ontology.10 
This way the world-picture of the securitizing actor is not only a representation but also made 
into reality. The mythical second-order language is made into first-order language, and its “innocent” 
reality is forced upon the world. To the entrepreneurs and other actors involved it has become a 
“natural” necessity with a need to make order, even if it implies making the world match the map. 
Maybe that is why war against liminars are so often total; it attempts a total expatriation or a total 
“solution” (like the Holocaust) and not only a victory on the battlefield. If the enemy is not even 
considered a legitimate Other, the door may be more open to a kind of violence that is way beyond 
any war conventions, any jus in bello. 
This way, securitizing is legitimized: The entrepreneur has succeeded both in launching his 
world-view and in prescribing the necessary measures taken against it. This is possible by using the 
myths, by speaking on behalf of the natural and eternal, where truth is never questioned.  
 
Conclusion 
                                                           
10 The Copenhagen School’s stepwise illustration of a securitization process may be confusing. They say that an 
identity can go from a non-politicized to politicized to securitized mode (Wæver 1993). What should be underlined is that 
this politization is always directed at the boundaries. Within the group the referent object is necessarily de-politicized in the 
sense that it encapsulates the entire group. The point with securitization is that the politization/securitization is about placing 
the political challenge or the threat outside the group. 
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I have addressed the question of how an identity can become securitized and have argued in 
favor of a flexible and dynamic view of identity, based upon a metaphysics of becoming. This should 
help us avoid some theoretical pitfalls which could lead to a rigid objectivist and causal analysis. 
Through a brief discussion of different approaches to national identities, the processural, relational 
and boundary drawing aspects of all identities were underlined. To understand how an identity gains 
strength and how it becomes a “trump”, Barthes’ (1993) theory of myths was examined. As a myth is a 
depoliticized speech, it turns history into nature and makes the ambiguous ordered. It is thus easy to 
securitize. However, myths and identities cannot be established by strong agents alone. Identity can 
better be seen as a Foucauldian discourse, a productive field of order, truth and knowledge. On the 
other hand, when it comes to the securitizing process, some sort of agency must be introduced. The 
“conflict entrepreneur” may function as such an agent, even though still embedded in the discursive 
field. For him to succeed, he must provide both a world-view and a solution to the threats this view 
contains. He will have to make the uncertain certain by naming liminars and Others. The liminars 
represent by their very existence a threat to the entrepreneur’s order of things. They must therefore be 
“ordered” -- forced to become either a Self or an Other. The reason why this can be done legitimately 
is through a depoliticized innocent representation of the world, a representation based on myths. 
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